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Introduction
Anxiety disorders constitute a major global health burden (1) . They are characterized by disrupted emotional processing, working memory and decision-making (2; 3). Understanding impaired cognitive processing in anxiety disorders is important to identify targets for cognitive-based therapies for anxiety. Patients with anxiety frequently report difficulties concentrating and making decisions: demonstrating, for instance, increased risk avoidant behavior (4-7) (see Table 1 for a summary of findings). Risk here is defined as uncertain situations in which the outcome probabilities are known, contrary to ambiguity which involves unknown probabilities. Models of economic decisions, such as Prospect Theory (8) (9) (10) , suggest that decision-making under risk, in particular the commonly observed preference for sure outcomes over risky outcomes with equal or higher expected value, can be explained by a combination two phenomena: the diminishing sensitivity to outcome value as value increases, resulting in risk aversion, and the tendency to weigh potential losses more than potential gains, resulting in loss aversion. No study to date has, however, clearly distinguished risk from loss aversion in anxiety.
Risk-taking behaviors in anxiety have been examined in a handful of studies. In one study (6) , different groups of patients (anxiety disorder, mood disorder, learning disorder) and a group of healthy controls were administered a risk-taking questionnaire. Only anxious patients exhibited reduced levels of risk-taking relative to controls, suggesting that increased risk avoidance may be specific to anxiety. However, questionnaires are non-objective and subject to well-established limitations including demand characteristics (13) . In a modified version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (7) , patients with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) exhibited increased avoidance of decks with accumulated low magnitude but consistent losses. However, the IGT confounds multiple learning and decision-making processes and behavior could be explained by risk aversion, loss aversion or learning. In another study (5) , the authors addressed some of these concerns by administering a probabilistic gambling task, which does not involve learning. Pathologically anxious individuals exhibited a strong reduction in their propensity to choose the riskier gambles relative to controls. However, once again, it cannot be determined from this design whether avoidance of these gambles is driven by enhanced aversion to risk, aversion to losses, or a combination. Finally, patients with anxiety tend to overestimate the risk of negative events (4) but it is unclear whether this might also extend to the positive domain. In sum, prior work assessing risk-taking behavior in anxiety is unclear.
There is also a strong hypothesis that loss aversion should increase with anxiety, given the associated negative biases in emotional and attentional processes, as well as the heightened sensitivity to large negative outcomes (2; 14) . However, somewhat surprisingly, there are no published studies to date examining loss aversion in relation to anxiety in adult participants.
One study looked at this question in adolescents (11) and found no difference in loss aversion between anxious and healthy adolescents. In other studies (5; 12) , the gambling tasks used did not allow dissociating risk from loss aversion.
Here, we therefore adapted a previously published gambling task (15; 16) to clearly separate risk and loss aversion and explore performance in a group of healthy and unmedicated anxious individuals. By modeling participants' behavior with a computational model derived from Prospect Theory, we were able to adequately estimate and separate these processes;
hypothesizing that, relative to healthy controls, pathologically anxious individuals would exhibit both increased risk and loss aversion.
Methods and Materials

Participants
Unmedicated individuals meeting criteria for GAD (N=29) and matched healthy volunteers (N=26) were recruited by advertisement. Data from four anxious and three control participants were excluded because of insensitivity to value in the gambling task (3 anxious, 1 control) or more than 10% of missed trials (1 anxious, 2 controls), making loss and risk aversion impossible to model. Final analyses included 25 pathologically anxious individuals (20 females, 5 males, mean age 25.2 years ± SD 4.90) and 23 healthy controls (18 females, 5 males, mean age 25.74 years ± SD 6.55) ( Table 2 ). Participants provided written informed consent and were paid for their participation. The study was approved by University College London research ethics committee.
Procedure
Participants were pre-screened by completing the trait section of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (17) online after expressing interest in participating in the study. High trait anxiety constitutes a vulnerability factor for anxiety disorders, with pathologically anxious individuals usually scoring above 50 (18; 19) . A phone screening was conducted on participants scoring under 35 (prospective healthy controls) or above 50 (prospective anxious individuals) on the trait anxiety scale. Exclusion criteria included: medication for psychiatric disorder (e.g. antidepressants) or consumption of cannabis in the last 30 days, consumption of any other recreational drug in the last week, alcohol or drug abuse in the last 6 months, current or past neurological disorder, current or past diagnosis of: schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, ADHD, learning disability. Any other current or past psychiatric diagnosis was also an exclusion criterion for the control group. All participants were fluent in English.
During their visit to the laboratory, all participants were first administered the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) (20) to confirm eligibility. Because of high comorbidity with GAD (21; 22), major depressive disorder (MDD) and other anxiety or anxiety-related disorders (panic, PTSD, OCD, agoraphobia, eating disorders) did not constitute exclusion criteria for the anxious group as long as criteria for current GAD were met. Participants also completed the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR) (23) to measure verbal IQ.
Participants then practiced the emotional decision-making task by completing (i) a practice of the emotional memory task alone, (ii) a practice of the gambling task alone, and (iii) a practice on the combined task. The practice gambling task used a tailoring procedure (15; 16) to target each participant's indifference point, i.e. the difference in expected value between the gamble and the sure option such that the participant is indifferent between the two options. Specifically, it started with "extreme" trials where the values of the two options were clearly different; then these values were dynamically adjusted throughout the practice depending on the participant's choices. The decisions were of two types: mixed gamble trials, for which the sure option was always £0 and the gamble involved a potential gain and a potential loss; and gain-only gambles, which involved a choice between a sure gain and a risky gamble with 50% chance of winning a higher amount and 50% chance of not winning anything (£0). Both risk and loss aversion can contribute to safe choice on mixed gambles, while only risk aversion contributes to safe choices on gain-only gambles. Indifference points (IP) for mixed gamble trials were as follows: anxious group IP=5.06 ±2.30 (SD), median=4.5, range [2, 10] ; control group IP=3.74 ±2.37 (SD), median=4, range [0, 9.5] (t(46)=1.96, P=0.056). Indifference points for gain-only trials were as follows: anxious group IP=2.7 ±3.53 (SD), median=1.5, range [-2,8] ; control group IP=1.63 ±3.17 (SD), median=0.5, range [-2,8] (t(46)=1.10, P=0.28).
The gambles were embedded in an emotional working memory task as part of a secondary aim of this study (Supplemental Information), allowing us to investigate (i) whether gambling decisions are modulated by the emotional context as a function of anxiety (as suggested by (15) ); and (ii) whether working memory is modulated by the emotional context, and again whether this modulation varies with anxiety (as suggested by (16)).
In each trial ( Figure 1 ), participants were presented with a pair of stimuli belonging to one of the four conditionsfearful faces, happy faces, neutral faces, objects (light bulbs)and were instructed to memorize their location. They then had to make a decision between a sure option and a risky 50-50 gamble. In each condition (happy, fearful, neutral, objects), there were 49 mixed gambles (7*7 matrix built), as well as 25 gain-only gambles (5*5 matrix), leading to a total of 296 trials, all randomly interleaved and split into 4 blocks. Both gamble matrices ( Figure S1 ) were centered on the participant's indifference point estimated from the practice gambling task. Finally, one of the two stimuli from the initial pair appeared in the center of the screen and participants had to recall the initial left/right location of that stimuli.
After the task, participants completed the STAI and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI (24); Table 2 ). As expected, both measures were significantly higher in anxious than control participants (trait anxiety: t(46)=7.62, P<0.001; BDI: t(46)=12.85, P<0.001).
Behavioral data analysis
Behavioral data were analyzed in Matlab, statistical tests performed in SPSS (version 22), and Bayesian tests in JASP (version 0.7.1) (25; 26). The propensity to choose the gamble was calculated separately for healthy controls and pathologically anxious individuals across all trials and compared using an independent two-sample t-test. Second, it was calculated separately for mixed and gain-only gambles, and analyzed in a 2-by-2 ANOVA with gamble type (within-subjects) and group (between-subjects) as factors. Reaction times, working memory accuracy, and missed trials, were analyzed in a similar way ( Table 3) .
Given that each participant's set of gamble values was centered on their indifference point from the practice gambling task, participants made decisions about differently-valued gambles. Therefore, it was not possible to directly examine and compare gambling propensity as an index of risk-taking. Instead, our computational modeling approach allowed us to adequately estimate risk and loss aversion for each participant, with the tailoring procedure being key to improving sensitivity of the model fitting procedure by ensuring that a maximum of decisions were close to each participant's indifference point.
To estimate loss and risk aversion for each participant, a 3-parameter Prospect Theoryderived model was used (8; 10; 27; 28) . For each trial, the subjective utilities (u) of the gamble and the sure option were estimated using the following equations (with losses coded as negative values):
λ represents loss aversion: λ>1 indicates overweighing of losses relative to gains and λ<1 the converse. ρ represents the curvature of the utility function, which reflects varying sensitivity to changes in values as value increases. If ρ<1, the utility function is concave for gains and convex for losses, resulting in risk aversion (greater utility for a sure gain than for a risky 50/50 gamble with the same expected value); ρ>1 indicates risk-seeking.
These subjective utility values were then passed through a softmax function to estimate the probability of choosing the gamble on each trial (coded as 1 or 0 for choosing the gamble or the sure option, respectively), with the inverse temperature parameter µ:
Best-fitting parameters (λ, ρ, and µ) were estimated using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure (Supplemental Information). Three models were run using this procedure: λ, ρ, and Table 4 .
Model comparison was performed using Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) scores (29) .
BIC scores were summed across participants with lower sum BIC scores indicating better model fit. Pseudo-R 2 were also calculated and averaged across participants, providing an estimate of the proportion of variance in the data explained by the model. Model accuracy was calculated as the proportion of choices correctly predicted by the model, for each participant using their parameter estimates. Similarly, choice data were simulated using parameters from the winning model, separately for each group and each gamble type to verify that participants' propensity to gamble was accurately explained by the model. Finally, to test the reliability of our parameter estimates and ensure varying indifference points (and varying range of gamble values) across participants did not affect our findings, we ran simulation analyses to recover the parameters from simulated data (Supplemental Information, Table S1 , Table S2 ).
The distribution of both λ and ρ parameters was positively skewed (Skewness values = 1.2 for λ and 1.7 for ρ), so they were log-transformed before running statistical tests. In addition, respectively. Another approach to reduce the skewness in the distribution of parameter estimates is to use a maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation procedure (30) . Running this procedure provided identical inference (Supplemental Information, Table S3 ).
Risk and loss aversion estimates were compared between groups with independent twosample t-tests. In addition, Bayesian analyses (31) (32) (33) (34) were conducted to corroborate significant effects, as well as to provide evidence for null effects (see Supplemental Information for details). Additional exploratory analyses (Supplemental Information) controlled for depression diagnosis ( Figure S2 ) and examining working memory performance across groups and its modulation by emotional cues (Figure S4 ).
Results
Risk and loss aversion
Our Prospect Theory-derived model, estimating risk and loss aversion across all trials (Model 1), rather than separately for each emotion conditions (Models 2-3) was the winning model, also outperforming all other comparison models (Models 4-8; Table 4 ). Estimated across all trials, the average loss aversion parameter (λ) across all participants was 2.039 (±SD 0.625), greater than 1 and consistent with loss averse decisions, and with previous literature . Critically Bayesian analysis provided substantial evidence for a difference in risk aversion between groups (BF 10 = 3.32), but favored the null over a group difference in loss aversion (BF 10 = 0.29) enabling us to accept the null and say that there was no effect of group on loss aversion.
Examining the 2 nd best performing model (Model 3) to assess a possible role of emotional priming on decision-making showed that risk and loss aversion were not affected by incidental emotional primes. There was also no difference between groups in how incidental emotions affected decision parameters (see Supplemental Information and Figure S3 for a complete analysis of Model 3 parameters). Figure 3A , solid-filled bars), such that propensity to gamble on mixed gamble trials did not differ between groups (t(46)=-0.393, P=0.696, Cohen's d=0.114) but anxious individuals gambled significantly less than controls on gainonly trials (t(46)=-2.728, P=0.009, Cohen's d=0.788). Note, however, that due to the tailoring process during the practice gambling task, the range of values used to build the gambles for the main task varied across participants; therefore, examining the proportion of chosen gambles may not reflect actual levels of risk-taking given that values may be different between subjects. These were instead reflected by risk and loss aversion parameters estimated from the Prospect Theory model (and shown in Figure 2B ), taking into account the specific range of values for each participant. In turn, using these parameters to generate behavior on the task (i.e., a posterior predictive model) accurately explained participants' propensity to gamble given their specific gamble set, as depicted by the checker board-filled bars in Figure   3A . Figure 3B ) and gain-only gamble trials ( Figure 3C ).
Propensity to gamble is accurately explained by the model
Discussion
This study demonstrated that relative to healthy individuals, pathologically anxious individuals exhibit enhanced risk aversion, but similar levels of loss aversion. Originally, given the broad literature associating anxiety with more conservative decision-making styles (2; 3), we hypothesized that both risk and loss aversion would increase in pathological anxiety. Interestingly, however, only the first hypothesis was confirmed. Indeed, Bayesian analyses enabled us to accept the null hypothesis that pathological anxiety has no effect on loss aversion.
Anxious individuals show clear avoidance behaviors (6; 38-41) . The present data suggests that this behavior is driven by aversion to taking risks rather than aversion to losses per se. This is consistent with prior work demonstrating that pathologically anxious individuals show reduced tendency to take risks during gambling tasks (5; 7). Psychologically, a possible explanation for this increased risk-avoidance bias could stem from a bias in the evaluation of risk, with anxious individuals overestimating the risk of negative events (4). This would result in an overestimation of the probabilities of the "bad" outcome of the gamble (regardless of whether that outcome is a smaller gain, a loss, or nothing, and therefore independent of loss aversion), leading to disengagement from risky decisions. An early model of anxiety suggested that intolerance to uncertainty is a pivotal feature of GAD (42) . Decades of research on animal models of anxiety have also converged with human models, associating anxiety with altered responses to uncertainty, unpredictability and/or uncontrollability of events and outcomes (43; 44) . Intolerance to uncertainty likely plays a key role in the development and maintenance of pathological anxiety and may be an underlying mechanism of the increased aversion to risk observed in this study.
The hypothesis that loss aversion would also be enhanced in anxiety was rejected in the present study, as confirmed with Bayesian tests. The myriad of studies indicating negative attentional and emotional biases in anxiety (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) led to the assumption that anxious individuals may give more weight to negative outcomes (in this case monetary losses) compared to healthy individuals. Yet, this had never been investigated by directly looking at loss aversion. Here, loss aversion was demonstrated in both healthy controls and pathologically anxious individuals: on average participants weighed monetary losses approximately twice as much as monetary gains. However, this ratio was the same across both groups. This is consistent with a recent study in adolescents, which did not find any loss aversion difference between anxious and healthy adolescents (11) . This finding is also in line with recent reports suggesting that induced anxiety in a sample of healthy participants, via threat of shock, did not influence high-level economic decisions, including loss aversion (16; 51) . Although unexpected, this result may suggest that when the prospect of a loss or negative outcome is evaluated on its own, pathologically anxious individuals may be more sensitive than controls and report more negative judgments and affect; however, when they have to weigh this prospective loss against a prospective gain in order to make a decision, the degree by which they do so is similar to controls. Nevertheless, this is an important refinement of our understanding of the manifestation of pathological anxiety; it may be more about risk than loss.
With this study, we have addressed a significant omission in previous designs of risky decision-making task (5; 7; 12), where safer choices could be driven both by risk or loss aversion. Here we were able to reliably estimate both decision parameters within the same task and computational framework. However, a few limitations of the current study are worth mentioning. First, we note that the task was embedded in an emotional memory task and that decision-making per se, without concomitant emotional priming and working memory could not be directly examined. Future studies should therefore aim to replicate the present findings using a simpler and more direct design. This would also permit the addition of loss-only trials in order to assess whether risk aversion in the gain and loss domains differ between groups.
Second, despite our attempts at disentangling the effects of anxiety and depression (see Supplemental Information for details), a possible effect of depression on risk/loss aversion remains possible and should be addressed in future studies explicitly designed to disentangle these effects. Similarly, higher sample sizes will be needed in future studies to separately assess the role of specific anxiety disorders such as panic, phobia or social anxiety. Third, we note the sex unbalance in our sample, with far more female participants. Although this is generally expected in anxiety, a recent study has suggested that decision-making may be impaired differentially in anxious men and women (52) . Also, our anxious sample was recruited through advertisement in the general population, followed by telephone screening and structured face-to-face clinical interview, rather than through clinical services. Despite the advantage of being untreated, their behavior may differ from that of treatment-seeking patients encountered in clinical practice. Future work on treatment-seeking anxious patients may thus be useful to address possible differences. Finally, recent literature suggest that stress is an important modulator of decision-making under risk (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) , and may also interact with anxiety (58; 59). While we did not manipulate stress here, it would be interesting for future studies to investigate whether the effect of stress induction on risk aversion differ between pathologically anxious individuals and healthy controls.
Clinically, our results may be of importance given that pathologically anxious individuals frequently report difficulties making decisions in their everyday life, demonstrating, for instance, debilitating avoidance biases. In particular, these findings may help refine our ↓ means decreased risk taking, = no effect. GAD: Generalized Anxiety Disorder, PAD: Panic Attack Disorder, MDD: Major Depressive Disorder, SocPh: Social Phobia, SAD: Separation Anxiety Disorder. RTBS: Risk-Taking Behaviors Scale, IGT: Iowa Gambling Task, PGT: Probabilistic Gambling Task.
Table 2. Demographics, questionnaire scores, and participants' characteristics
Current diagnoses of other anxiety disorders within the anxious group (at the time of study) included: panic disorder (N=5), panic attacks (not meeting criteria for panic disorder, N=3), PTSD (N=3), agoraphobia (N=2), OCD (N=1), compulsions and/or obsessions (not meeting criteria for OCD, N=6), bulimia (N=1), binge eating (not meeting criteria for bulimia, N=2). Social anxiety and specific phobias were not assessed.
Table 3. Summary of additional task variables
Note that for comparing WM accuracy values (negatively skewed because of performance ceiling at 1) between groups, their values were arcsine-transformed before running statistical tests. None of these other variables differed significantly between anxious and control groups, ruling out the possibility that they may have driven the observed difference in risk aversion. On each trial, participants were first presented with a pair of faces (all happy, all fearful, or all neutral) or objects (light bulbs) and had 3 s to memorize it. They then had to decide whether to choose a sure option or a risky gamble. In mixed gamble trials, the sure option was always £0 and the mixed gamble involved a 50% chance to win the amount in green and a 50% chance to lose the amount in red. In gain-only gamble trials, the sure option was a small guaranteed gain, and the gamble involved a 50% chance to win a higher amount and a 50% chance to get £0. Finally, a probe from the first array was presented and participants had to report its position. Current diagnoses of other anxiety disorders within the anxious group (at the time of study) included: panic disorder (N=5), panic attacks (not meeting criteria for panic disorder, N=3), PTSD (N=3), agoraphobia (N=2), OCD (N=1), compulsions and/or obsessions (not meeting criteria for OCD, N=6), bulimia (N=1), binge eating (not meeting criteria for bulimia, N=2). Social anxiety and specific phobias were not assessed. Note that for comparing WM accuracy values (negatively skewed because of performance ceiling at 1) between groups, their values were arcsine-transformed before running statistical tests. None of these other variables differed significantly between anxious and control groups, ruling out the possibility that they may have driven the observed difference in risk aversion. 
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